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The Right to a Corruption-Free Society as an
Individual and Collective Human Right:
Elevating Official Corruption to a Crime
under International Law
NDIVA KOFELE-KALE*
"When the state is in healthy condition, all things prosper;
when it is corrupt, all things go to ruin."
-Democritus
I. Introduction
The financial crises that swept through much of Asia between 1998 and 19991 have
renewed calls for a new global financial and economic system.2 If this momentum holds
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1. Actually the Asian crises were part of a series of financial crises that have rocked the very foundations
of the world economy, beginning first with the European currency crisis of 1992, followed by the Mexican
crisis of 1994-95, and most recently, the Asian crisis. In a piece that appeared in the Dec. 29, 1997 New York
Times, Robert A. Johnson distinguishes the Asian crisis from the preceding two in terms of the degree to which
the latter upheavals were anticipated by sophisticated investors and also by their differential impacts on inves-
tors. The Asian turbulence, he argues, is "a more potent psychological disturbance than the Mexican crisis of
1994-95 or the European currency crisis of 1992 and was perceived as an isolated event." The European crisis,
on the other hand, "was a price adjustment to rebalance Europe in response to German unification." Neither
the Mexican nor the European financial difficulties markedly changed investors' views of the health of the
world economy since they were both "anticipated well in advance by sophisticated thinkers in both investment
and government circles." See Robert A. Johnson, Wat Asia's Financial Crisis Portends, N.Y. TMEs, Dec. 29,
1997, at A19.
2. The 1998 Joint Sessions of the Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development were devoted almost exclusively to talk about the archi-
tecture of a new international monetary system. See Michel Camdessus, Address to the Board of Governors of
150 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
then those fortunate architects who have been recruited to design and supervise the con-
struction of this new global edifice3 can make their task so much simpler by borrowing
some valuable construction principles from the crises.
Of the many lessons that the Asian financial crises may have left us with, I will focus on
five. The first is that it exposed some major structural weaknesses in the Asian development
model and put to rest the myth of the invincibility of the Asian economy,4 a myth that had
the Fund, Boards of Governors 1998 Annual Meetings, Press Release No. 2, Oct. 6, 1998, at 2 [hereinafter
Address to Board of Governors] (visited Mar. 9,2000) <http://www.imf.org/EXTERNAL/AM/1998/speeches/
PRO2E.pdf>; see also Michel Camdessus, Concluding Remarks, ClosingJoint Session of the Annual Meetings,
Press Release No. 67, Oct. 8, 1998, at 2 (visited Mar. 9,2000) <http://www.imf.org/EXTERNAL/AM/1998/
speeches/PR67E.pdf> (quoting the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund)
[hereinafter Concluding Remarks]; see alsoJames D. Wolfensohn, The Other Crisis: Address, IMF/World Bank
Boards of Governors 1998 Annual Meetings, Press Release No. 3, Oct. 6, 1998 (James Wolfensohn, an Amer-
ican, is the President of the World Bank Group) [hereinafter The Other Crisis] (visited Mar. 9, 2000)
<http://www.imf.org/EXTERNAL/AM/1998/speeches/PRO3E.pdf>.
3. While one may quibble over where the reconstruction is taking place, whether it is in the "infra" or
the "supra" structure, is it still appropriate to ask what exactly is being redesigned? What does a new global
financial architecture mean? Is it supposed to mean a strengthened Bretton Woods system that will be more
responsive to future financial crises? If so, would this shored-up structure mean the same thing as a restructured
system of global capitalism? Or, is the reference to a new international financial system just another way of
saying that the role of international financial and economic institutions, in helping to promote in member
states the kinds of social, institutional and policy reform that would make financial crises less frequent and less
severe, needs to be redefined? But even more important than the architecture of a house (system) is "how
people inside behave towards each other and how they resolve conflicts. Here, we have good principles that
have served us well over the past decades: cooperation, democratic principles, predictability, and accountability
towards each other. We therefore need to build on this foundation to strengthen the architecture of the
international financial system, adapting it to new challenges." Concluding Remarks, supra note 2, at 2. A clear
understanding of what is meant by a "New Global Financial Architecture" is critical in order to situate the
problem of corruption and the fight against it in its proper context. And here I want to raise the question,
impertinent though it may sound, whether the New Global House has any room for those who are the real
victims of corruption? Will this redesigned global superstructure provide for how the people inside behave
towards each other and how they resolve conflicts? Some of the architects working so diligently to rebuild a
battered global financial system have approached their task with a sort of evangelical fervor. One is given the
unmistakable impression that this unusual concerted international response to the Asian crisis has as its principal
aim promoting the interests of the peoples of the Third World (be they from Indonesia or Vanuatu or Burkina
Faso) and of addressing the fundamental issues of equity and social justice that set them apart from the rest of
the world. It may very well be the case that the intended beneficiaries of all this multinational restlessness are
the peoples of the Third World. That may very well be the case though there is much more that explains this
heightened burst of activity. It would seem that Euro-American economic self-interests are behind this unre-
lenting push for financial stabilization: adequate protection for foreign investments; good returns on investment;
secure means for repatriating profits for shareholder dividends; and so on. This push for reform is not altogether
spurred by altruistic motives, and there is nothing wrong with that. The rest of the world will and should
simply hop on board this train and ride it till they reach their destination. See e.g., The Other Crisis, supra note
2. This case will be embellished in subsequent pages where the international legal regime to combat corruption
is critically examined. In this context, the restrictive definition given to corruption as well as the limited geo-
graphic scope of several of the anti-bribery conventions would suggest a concern for protecting the financial
interests of their Euro-American signatories and a reform approach geared toward the edifice itself with little
regard for some of its occupants. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
4. These economies were once held up as models of prudent and sustainable economic policies. Yet, in
the twinkling of an eye, they went from being shining examples of the most successful development experience
in modern history to models of economic stagnation and decline. Growth rates that had averaged eight to ten
percent per annum over many years have turned negative, economies that had enjoyed continuous high em-
ployment and experienced labor shortages now suffer from extensive and rapidly rising unemployment. And it
took much less time than it took the 1929 stock market crash to turn into the Great Depression to transform
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taken on the trappings of Euro-American folklore. The devastating impact of the crises on
the very foundations of the Asian economy may have driven some governments anxious to
repair the damage to accept the painful and humiliating experience of submitting to the
tutelage of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Secondly, the crises underscored how
the economies of Asia, Africa, the Americas and Europe coexist in an integrated global
economy such that the contagion effects of problems in one region quickly spread to the
other regions. So, although the epicenter of the 1997 financial earthquake was in Southeast
Asia, the eddies were and continue to be felt around the globe. But even more, this is not
simply a crisis involving a few countries. Rather, in the assessment of Michel Camdessus,
Managing Director of the IMF, it is the entire global system that is in crisis precisely because
the system has "not yet sufficiently adapted to the opportunities and risks of globalization."'
Albert Fishlow, a Senior Fellow with the New York Foreign Relations Council, is even
more pointed in attributing the crises to "a systematic failure of global capitalism ... [be-
cause the] old rules did not work, and the new ones haven't been invented." Implicit in
Fishlow's observation is the view that the disturbances in the Asian financial markets were
not random or fortuitous occurrences. And he may not be that far off the mark. Several
commentators have suggested that these financial difficulties reflect factors that are intrinsic
in the global financial system itself and germane to the workings of the international capital
markets-that is, international capital markets and financial panics are opposite sides of a
Janus-faced global system. 7
The crises also demonstrated that corruption of public officials is a practice that is not
confined to any one region of the world but occurs everywhere.' More especially, corruption
flourishes in countries where the culture of transparency and accountability9 is lacking;
the Asian economic miracles into structurally unstable systems incapable of formulating their own economic
policies and assigned to the tutelage of IMF. Never has the economic outlook for such a large group of
economies changed so radically and so rapidly. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), Trade and Development Report, ch. 111 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 UNCTAD Report].
5. Address to Board of Governors, supra note 2, at 2.
6. Quoted in Jose Ripoll, International Capital Movements: A Review of Selected Opinions on their
Determinants and Effects, at 11 I[hereinafter Capital Movements] <http://www.globalprogress.org/ingles/apor
taciones/ripoll.html>. This view is shared by the UNCTAD, which acknowledges, in its 1998 Trade and
Development Report, that the Asian crisis was initially misdiagnosed, by no less a financial watchdog than the
IMF, as an exchange rate and payments adjustment problem. This set the stage for a policy response based
almost entirely on the standard instruments of monetary and fiscal tightening and high interest rates. These
traditional policies were spectacular failures as antidotes to the problem and may even have aggravated it. See
1998 UNCTAD Report, supra note 4, ch. III.D; see also Michael Mandelbaum, IMF Cure May Worsen Asia's
Ailments, NEwSDAY, Feb. 11, 1998, at A43.
7. See Capital Movements, supra note 6, at 11; see also Richard Lambert, Financial Panics: Soutb Sea to South
Korea, FiN. TiMEs, Jan. 10, 1998, at 1 (After reviewing the history of financial crises, the author concludes that
turbulence in the capital markets is the norm, not the exception. International capital markets and financial
panics go together; you can't have one without, from time to time, unleashing the other.).
8. WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 10 (1992) (Corruption occurs in all countries and in
many different forms. It tends to thrive when resources are scarce, and governments, rather than markets,
allocate them; when civil servants are underpaid; when rules are unreasonable or unclear; when controls are
pervasive and regulations excessive; when disclosure and punishment are unlikely.).
9. At its simplest, accountability means holding public officials responsible for their actions. See id. at 13.
It has been defined more broadly as the obligation to render an account for a responsibility that has been
conferred. It means that those individuals and organizations charged with the performance of particular actions
or activities are held responsible. This responsibility is judged or measured in terms of clearly articulated codes
of conduct. Transparency, on the other hand, simply means openness: the ready, unobstructed access to and
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where republican institutions have been compromised; where the rule of law has broken
down and, as a consequence, legal rules no longer exist or where they do, are simply not
enforced; and where market participants do not operate under an internationally accepted
set of principles or standards.i ° It is in environments such as this that the abuse of public
office for private gain is frequently encountered."
Finally, this turbulence makes clear that any concerted multilateral efforts aimed at a
fundamental reformation of the world financial system must resolve to place corruption
under some form of international discipline. And like any other facet of the crisis, the war
against corruption cannot be waged exclusively at the national level through domestic leg-
islation that criminalizes the conduct. Rather, the most effective way to combat corruption
is by elevating it to the status of a crime of universal interest, i.e., a crime under international
law that (a) entails individual responsibility and punishment, and (b) is subject to universal
jurisdiction.
This article will argue that there is sufficient state practice to support a claim for an
emerging international customary law prohibiting corruption in all societies. That is, a case
can be made for the right to a corruption-free society as a fundamental human right; a right
that should be recognized as a component part of the right to economic self-determination
and the right to development. Alternatively, the right to a corruption-free environment can
be viewed as a freestanding, autonomous right, if you will, a right in its own right. Against
this backdrop, the article will proceed first with a discussion of the international regime
against corruption, followed by a critique of that regime. Next, the case will be made for
considering the right to a corruption-free society as a fundamental human right and, as a
corollary, treating a breach of this right as a crime under international law. The article will
then conclude by drawing attention to some of the obstacles that may delay the emergence
of an anti-corruption norm in international law.
I. The International Legal Regime to Combat Corruption
The last five years have witnessed a burst of law making at both the national and inter-
national levels on the subject of corruption. So many leading international organizations
-such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF, the Council of Europe, the
European Union, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2 the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA),' 3
availability of data and information from public as well as private sources that is accurate, timely, relevant and
comprehensive; tolerance for public debate, public scrutiny and public questioning of political, economic and
social policy choices. See Economic Commission for Africa, Africa Governance Forum (AGF I1), Accountability
and Transparency in Africa: A Concept Paper, 1 (1998) <http://www.unsia.org/cluster/govern/forum2>.
10. See Michel Camdessus, Strengthening the Architecture of the International Monetary System, Press
Conference (Oct. 3, 1998).
11. According to Robert A. Johnson the Asian crisis exposed the hidden side of the Janus-faced Asian
economy, where once everyone saw efficiency and vitality, now the image is one of widespread corruption and
waste. See Johnson, supra note 1, at At9.
12. The OECD was established in 1961 to promote economic growth and freer trade and to expand and
improve development aid to the developing countries. It is made up of fifteen EU countries, Japan, Canada,
Australia, the United States and a number of Central European countries.
13. The Washington-based Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) describes itself as a North-South forum
dedicated to forging policy consensus on development priorities among African governments, their northern
partners, and non-governmental groups working in and on Africa. African governments, donor agencies and
Africa-oriented international NGOs took part in setting up the GCA, which went operational in 1991. It was
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and the International Chamber of Commerce14-have articulated anti-corruption policies
and strategies. The concerted drive at the multilateral level to confront the problem of
corruption has given birth to a number of anti-corruption instruments, which together
make up the current international legal regime to combat corruption. The burst of law
making energy began with the 1995 European Union Convention on the Protection of the
European Communities' Financial Interests and its two additional Protocols,"5 followed by
the 1996 Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (Inter-American Convention)
and the 1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, ending with the 1999 Council of Europe Criminal
Law Convention on Corruption. Valiant though these developments have been, these in-
struments do not go far enough in dealing with the global problem of corruption.' 6
A. THE EUROPEAN UNION ANTI-CORRUPTION CONVENTION
Specific provisions in the three European Community treaties had earlier anticipated the
need to combat acts of fraud: the treaty establishing the European Community (EC Treaty),
the treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty) and the
treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (Eurocoal Treaty) within the
so-called first pillar of the institutional structure of the European Union (articles 209a EC
Treaty, 183a Euratom Treaty and 78i Eurocoal Treaty). These provisions articulate the
member states' obligation to take the same measures to counter fraud affecting the financial
interests of the Community as they take to counter fraud affecting their own financial
interests. To fulfill this mission member states are required to coordinate their action aimed
at protecting the financial interests of the Community against fraud. To this end they shall
organize, with the help of the commission, close and regular cooperation between the
competent departments of their administrations. To reduce the inconsistencies between laws
on fraud in several member states that make it possible for international fraud to flourish,
it became necessary to draft a convention with a common definition of fraud to protect the
Community's financial interests on the basis of article K.3.2. Under Title VI of the Treaty
of the European Union, article K.3 authorizes the council to draw up conventions that it
recommends to the member states for adoption in accordance with their respective con-
stitutional arrangements. On June 13, 1995, the President of the European Parliament
authorized the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs (Committee) to draw up
a report on combating corruption in Europe, with Mrs. Heinke Salish as the rapporteur.
founded on the premise that Africa's development must come from within, but with the assistance of its friends
and partners from outside. For more on the GCA, consult its home page on the worldwide web: <http://
www.gca-cma.org>.
14. See International Chamber of Commerce, Recommendations to Combat Extortion and Bribery in Interna-
tional Business Transactions, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, (Mar. 26, 1996).
15. Convention on the Protection of the European Communities' Financial Interests, 1995 OJ. (C316/49)
[hereinafter Convention]. See also Protocol to the Convention, 1996 OJ. (C313/2). See also Second Protocol
to the Convention, 1997 OJ. (C221/12).
16. In a 1995 Resolution on combating corruption in Europe, the European Parliament called for stronger
measures to be taken by member states of the European Union to combat corruption. The resolution raised
concern about the current anti-corruption measures, noting that the agreements concluded between the mem-
ber states on this subject are inadequate. See European Parliament, Report of the Committee on Civil Liberties
and Internal Affairs on Combating Corruption in Europe, DOC. EN\RR\287\287701 (Dec. 1, 1995) [here-
inafter European Parliament Resolution].
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The Committee's report on Combating Corruption in Europe was considered by the Eu-
ropean Parliament on December 1995, and it became the basis of a resolution.
The Resolution on Combating Corruption in Europe states, inter alia, that "corruption,
particularly in conjunction with organized crime, poses a threat to the functioning of the
democratic system and thus destroys public confidence in the integrity of the democratic
State" as well as that "combating corruption nationally and internationally concerns all
Member States and that the agreements concluded between the Member States on this
subject are inadequate [and] that legal provisions and stiffer penalties for crimes of corrup-
tion are not enough on their own and that success will be achieved primarily through
society's resolute condemnation of corruption and the determination of the responsible
authorities to combat it." 7 The 1995 Convention on'the Protection of European Com-
munities' Financial Interests builds on this earlier effort. It was drawn up under the terms
of article 209a of the Maastricht Treaty, which requires every Member State of the European
Union to take the same measures to counter fraud on the Community budget as they do
on their own financial interests. The convention tries to harmonize the various national
legal instruments for the criminal prosecution of fraudulent conduct endangering the Com-
munities' financial interests. In addition to adopting a common definition of fraud,'" the
convention also contains provisions requiring the Member States to incorporate the defi-
nition of fraud into their own body of criminal law. The 1995 Convention also includes
the usual provisions for jurisdiction, 19 extradition and prosecution,0 as well as mutual co-
operation in the investigation, prosecution and punishment of individuals accused of corn-
mitting fraud affecting the Communities' financial interests.2
The following year the First Protocol to the Convention on the Protection of the Com-
munities' Financial Interests was signed. The Protocol deals with corruption of public of-
ficials that endangers the Communities' financial interests. It fills in the gaps in existing
criminal law on corruption having a link with protection of the Communities' financial
interests that involve Community and/or national officials. As a consequence, the Protocol
17. Id.
18. Article 1(1) of the Convention defines the type of fraud that affects the European Communities' fi-
nancial interests as consisting of: (a) in respect of expenditure, any intentional act or omission relating to: the
use or presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete statements or documents, which has as its effect the
misappropriation or wrongful retention of funds from the general budget of the European Communities or
budgets managed by, or on behalf of the European Communities, nondisclosure of information in violation of
a specific obligation, with the same purposes other than those for which they were originally granted; (b) in
respect of revenue, any intentional act or omission relating to: the use or presentation of false, incorrect or
incomplete statements or documents, which has as its effect the illegal diminution of the resources of the
general budget of the European Communities or budgets managed by, or on behalf of the European Com-
munities, nondisclosure of information in violation of a specific obligation, with the same effect, misapplication
of a legally obtained benefit, with the same effect. Until this broad definition of fraud was formulated in the
convention, considerable differences could be observed in the substantive law of member states as to the type
of offenses covered under fraud. Most of the criminal offenses of fraud in the member states covered either
only expenditure fraud (subsidy fraud) or revenue fraud. The convention definition of fraud applies equally to
revenue and expenditure. See Lothar Kuhl, The Criminal Law Protection of the Communities' Financial Interests
Against Fraud-Part 1, 1998 Calm. L. REV. 259, 264-65 (1998) [hereinafter Kuhl Part 1]; Lothar Kuhl, The
Criminal Law Protection of the Communities' Financial Interests Against Fraud-Part 2, 1998 CRIM. L. REv. 323,
324-25 (1998) [hereinafter Kuhl Part 2].
19. See Convention, supra note 15, art. 4.
20. Id. art. 5.
21. Id. art. 6
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extends to offenses committed not just by national officials within each Member State but
by members of the Commission, Parliament, the Court ofJustice, and the Court of Auditors
in the exercise of their functions. The Second Protocol followed on the heels of the first
and incorporates certain areas that were left out of the Convention itself. In this sense, it
complements the provisions of the 1995 Convention. The main purpose of the Second
Protocol is the criminalization of money laundering and the confiscation of the fruits of
fraud, and for cooperation between the Commission and the national prosecuting author-
ities in the Member States with respect to fraud, corruption and money laundering.22
B. THE OECD CONVErION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS
In 1997, the European countries were able to secure a comprehensive anti-corruption
instrument that went beyond the limited goal of protecting only the Communities' financial
interests when they adopted the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Public Offi-
cials in International Business Transactions (OECD Convention).23 Like the new generation
of anti-corruption conventions, the OECD Convention differentiates between demand-
side and supply-side bribery. That is, the side that took the initiative that led to bribery and
then ascribes sanctions accordingly. The OECD Convention is a supply-side-oriented, anti-
bribery instrument and, as such, it only proscribes what, in the law of some countries, is
called active corruption or active bribery, meaning the offense committed by the person
who promises or gives the bribe, as contrasted with passive bribery, the offense committed
by the public official who receives the bribe. Bribery is defined in the OECD Convention
as the direct or indirect intentional offer or provision of "any undue pecuniary or other
advantage ... to [or for] a foreign public official" in violation of the official's legal duties
"in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage."24 Bribery is the offer
of payments to induce a breach of the official's duty. Thus, by limiting its scope to active
bribery, the OECD Convention only targets the bribe giver and not the receiver.
C. THE COtmCIL OF EUROPE'S 1999 CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTION
The Council of Europe's 1999 Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Criminal Law
Convention) is different from the OECD Convention in that it attacks corruption from
both the supply and demand sides. The instrument was actually designed as a framework
convention that: (i) enumerates the principles that States Parties would undertake to respect
in their national legislation and practice against corruption; and (ii) provides a basic struc-
ture that stands to be completed by various additional instruments. Although the Criminal
Law Convention has corruption as part of its title, that is the only place the word is men-
tioned in the instrument; throughout the document the reference is to bribery. The crime
of bribery is defined under two separate provisions to reflect the duality of the offense, i.e.,
its passive and active attributes. For instance, under article 2, which deals only with passive
bribery, this offense is defined as the intentional "promising, offering or giving by any
person, directly or indirectly, of any undue advantage to any of its public officials, for himself
22. See Kuhl Part 1, supra note 18, at 259; see also Kuhl Part 2, supra note 18, at 323.
23. See OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998) [hereinafter OECD Convention].
24. Id. art. 1, para. 1.
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or for herself or for anyone else, for him to act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his
or her functions. 2 5 Article 3, the active bribery provision, on the other hand, concerns itself
with the intentional act of requesting or receiving, or accepting an offer or a promise by a
public official, either directly or indirectly, of any undue advantage aimed at compromising
him in the exercise of his functions.
With articles 2 and 3 as predicate provisions, the convention then enumerates an ex-
haustive list of acts that it directs the States Parties to criminalize in their domestic legis-
lation. These are: active and passive bribery of foreign officials;2 6 active and passive bribery
in the business sector;27 trading in influence involving national and foreign public officials;28
bribery of international officials and other persons who carry out functions in international
organizations; 9 bribery of high officials of international organizations; 0 bribery in money
laundering;3' and bribery in accounting. 2 Within each of these enumerated acts, reference
is then made to either article 2 or 3 for the definition of the criminal offense of bribery
that is appropriate.
D. THE INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION
Of all the multilateral instruments that make up the international anti-corruption regime,
only the Inter-American Convention" attempts to give a broader meaning to the term
corruption or bribery. The Inter-American Convention was the first anti-corruption treaty
in the world resulting from the December 1994 Summit of the Americas Declaration of
Principles and Plan of Action.34 Like the Criminal Law Convention, the OAS anti-
corruption treaty attacks the problem from both the supply and demand sides.3 But then
it goes one step farther than the other instruments examined thus far; it expressly proscribes
"illicit enrichment"-defined as "a significant increase in the assets of a government official
that he cannot reasonably explain in relation to his lawful earnings during the performance
of his functions.''16 The focus on illicit enrichment as an integral part of the definition of
corruption in the Inter-American Convention is not shared by the other multilateral anti-
bribery conventions. They, on the other hand, are focused exclusively on two varieties of
corruption: either active or passive or both.
25. Id. art. 2.
26. Id. arts. 4, 6.
27. Id. arts. 7, 8.
28. Id. art. 12.
29. Id. arts. 9-11.
30. Id.
31. Id. art. 13.
32. Id. art. 14.
33. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, opened for signature Mar. 29, 1996, reprinted in 35
I.L.M. 724 (1996) [hereinafter Inter-American Convention].
34. An unprecedented 21 countries signed the convention immediately upon the conclusion of negotiations.
They were later joined by the United States and Guatemala. To date, 26 states have signed and 17 have
deposited instruments of ratification. Inter-American Convention, at B-58 (visited Feb. 29, 2000) <http://
www.oas.org/En/prog/juridico/english/Sigs/B-58.html>.
35. Inter-American Convention, supra note 33, art. VI.
36. Id. art. IX.
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III. A Critique of the International Anticorruption Regime
The current international anti-corruption regime does not go far enough in dealing with
the global problem of state-sanctioned or state-protected corruption. I see four major weak-
nesses with this regime. First, in all the conventions corruption is defined solely in terms
of the side that took the initiative that ultimately led to bribery or the one that received it.
As a result, the main focus is on two varieties of corruption: supply-side or active bribery,
on the one hand, meaning the offense was committed by the person who promised/offered
the bribes, and on the other hand, demand-side or passive bribery, meaning the offense was
committed by the pubic official who asked for/received the bribe. There are two problems
with restricting the definition of corruption to either supply or demand-side bribery or
both. In the first place, it gives the impression that corruption exists only between an active
bribe giver and a passive bribe taker. This Manichaean world excludes a whole class of
individuals who engage in outrageous acts of corruption outside the supply/demand-side
framework.
Let us take, for instance, the case of the unemployed wife of the president of an African
country who is given to an epicurean lifestyle that she indulges through frequent shopping
trips to the major fashion capitals of Europe. Before each trip, she either telephones the
head of the country's central bank or sends him a note demanding large sums of spending
money in foreign travelers checks. Each time the request comes in, the managing director
dutifully complies not because this first lady maintains an account in that bank against which
the withdrawals are posted or because she has any intentions of ever repaying the loan, but
because she is the wife of the President of the Republic and he stands to lose his job if he
does otherwise. Or, in another case that happened in another African country that will go
unnamed, the president commandeered all the available planes operated by the national
airlines to ferry guests to his daughter's wedding. To be sure, the bribe offered to a customs
official at a border town and the actions of the first lady and president just described con-
stitute corrupt practices. However, among them, there is a difference both in scale and
gravity.
Unfortunately, current international conventions offer no help in determining whom
the briber and the bribed are in the examples of the first lady or the doting father-cum-
president. Clearly their actions do not fit neatly into either category and herein lies one of
the major flaws in the orthodox definitions of corrupt practices. They tend to exclude
corrupt acts that do not fit comfortably in either categories of active or passive bribery.
Furthermore, when corruption is defined exclusively as passive bribery, invariably it is
the low-level, underpaid public functionaries pursuing rent seeking opportunities who get
targeted for sanctioning. That has been the history of bribery prosecutions in much of the
Third World. The only way to break out of this cycle of punishing only the least powerful
law breakers is to expand the definition of bribery to encompass the outrageous acts of
plunder by a head of state and members of his family.
A second weakness with the conventional definition of corruption is its treatment of this
phenomenon as essentially a binary relationship based on the principle of reciprocity. 7 That
is, for every case of bribery or corruption there is both a corruptor and a corrupted; a quid
37. The Explanatory Statement to the European Parliament's 1995 Resolution on Combating Corruption
in Europe states that corruption is based on the principle of reciprocity on which all societies are founded. See
European Parliament Resolution, supra note 16, at 8.
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in return for a quo. This view of corruption as involving a bribe giver and a bribe taker may
have symmetrical appeal but it does not account for the entire range of corrupt behavior.
It does not, for example, include acts of indigenous spoliation where there is only a taker,
a corrupted individual but no givers or corruptors3
s
A third observed weakness in the international regime is the preoccupation with active
bribery in some of these conventions such as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the
European Community Protection of Financial Interests Convention. In both of these in-
struments it is the offense of offering a bribe that is proscribed and not the receipt of a
bribe. The approach by the OECD Convention, which focuses only on the supply side, is
much too restrictive.3 9 Apologists for this approach have tried to justify it as a deferential
nod to the realities of international relations and, in particular, as a recognition of the
principle of respect for the sovereignty of other states. As one writer puts it: "the OECD
takes care not to intrude into other countries (sic) sovereignty, so the behaviour of foreign
officials itself is not a topic for the OECD."4°
This solicitous attitude toward sovereign sensibilities is misplaced and misdirected for a
couple of reasons. Viewed in the context of the fairly widespread agreement that state-
sanctioned corruption is both a development problem and a moral issue with clear inter-
national implications, this obsequious genuflection to the doctrine of sovereignty makes
little sense. Second, the determined efforts, evidenced by several international instruments,
all point to a multilateral approach4l as the best way to attack the problem of corruption.
Employing such a strategy will necessarily require states to waive some of their historical
sovereign rights. Even when these rights are not expressly waived, states must always be
prepared for the possibility that the international community might choose, in the higher
interest of waging an effective war on corruption, to "pierce the veil of sovereignty" if and
when the need arises.
But there is yet another problem with the preoccupation with regulating the supply end
of the corruption chain. It opens these instruments up to the criticism that they are primarily
concerned with protecting Euro-American economic interests while paying lip service to
the idea of global efforts to combat corruption. A European commentator on the global
38. Because the current international regime does not address this particular genre of corruption, domestic
bribery in these countries will continue unabated. See Michael Hershman, The OECD Convention Against Cor-
ruption is a Major Step Against Bribery. But a Totally Fair Market is Still Far Off, 17 INT'L FIN. L. Rev. 11 (May
1, 1998).
39. This approach, as explained by the Secretary-General of the OECD, is to leave each country responsible
for the conduct of its companies. "[Tlhe OECD Members, who are the major trading countries, are taking
responsibility for upholding the trading system. They are the major competitors in most international markets.
Their companies supply much of the large-scale bribery that undermines fair competition in the trading sys-
tem." See Donald J. Johnston, Building Integrity in Government: The OECD as Part of a Multiple Response,
A GLOBAL FORUM ON FIGHTING CORRUPTION, Conference Paper, Washington, D.C., Feb. 24,1999, at 2 (visited
Feb. 29, 2000) <http://www.usia.gov/topical/econ/integrity/document/johns.htm>.
40. Mark Pieth, International Efforts to Combat Corruption, A GLOBAL FORUM ON FIGHTING CORRUPTION,
Conference Paper, Washington, D.C., Feb. 25, 1999, at 2 (visited Feb. 29, 2000) <http://www.respondanet.
com/english/conferences/Gore/pieth.htm>.
41. All the anti-bribery conventions expressly incorporate provisions for mutual legal assistance in the fight
against corruption. Art. 9 of the OECD Convention, for example, directs each state party to provide prompt
and effective legal assistance to another party for the purpose of criminal investigations and proceedings brought
by a party concerning offenses within the scope of this convention. OECD Convention, supra note 23, art. 9.
See also Inter-American Convention, supra note 33, art. XIV.
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anti-corruption war observes that when the United States enacted the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act in 1977,42 many Europeans considered it "either as an act of moralism or a
kind of short term self mutilation in order to gain a long term advantage in competitiveness,
by forcing companies to win contracts without bribes."43 However, new awareness of the
extent of the globalization of the world economy forced the European nations to the re-
alization "that they themselves also were the actors and the theatre in the world of bribery."44
This has brought about a change in how Europeans view corruption abroad, which they
now see as negatively influencing their own trade opportunities. Suddenly corrupt dictators
like Suharto, the former President of Indonesia, are being recognized for what they truly
are: "irrational trade barriers blocking the access to interesting markets. '41 The gradual
realization that European businesses were being left behind in international markets may
very well have spurred Europe to action as policy makers saw the need to take measures to
address the problem of supply-side corruption. As a consequence, the legal regime the
Europeans put in place has as its mission creating a level playing field so that European
commercial interests can compete on equal terms with other major trading groups.46
Two recent European Union instruments lend some support to this view-the 1995
Treaty on the Protection of Financial Interests of the Community and the First Protocol
of 1996. The 1995 Treaty is the basis for the Protocol, which deals with criminalization of
transnational bribery endangering the Community's financial and economic interests. Like
all the other European-sponsored anti-bribery instruments, the principal objective of the
European Union contribution is the creation of a corruption-free global marketplace. For
it is only in such an environment that European commercial interests can compete fairly
42. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 et seq. (1998) [hereinafter FCPA].
The push for legislation to deal with corrupt payments by U.S. businesses operating in foreign markets was
prompted by "[i]nvestigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the mid-1970s that re-
vealed that over 400 U.S. companies admitted making questionable or illegal payments in excess of $300 million
to foreign government officials, politicians and political parties ... in order to secure some type of favorable
action" from these recipients. "Mhe FCPA was enacted to bring a halt to the bribery of foreign public officials
and to restore confidence in the integrity of the American business system." Arthur Aronoff, Antib'ibery Pro-
visions of the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, United States Department of Commerce, Office of the Chief Counsel
for International Commerce, <http://www.ita.doc.gov/legal/fcpa l.html>. Undoubtedly, the FCPA has as one
of its principle objectives to level the playing field in the international marketplace by forbidding U.S. business
enterprises and individuals from offering money, gifts, promises, or anything of value, to any foreign official
who assists in obtaining or retaining business in a corrupt fashion.
43. Pieth, supra note 40, at 1. It is true that the United States was quite concerned that its unilateral action
to outlaw bribery (the FCPA) put American businesses at a disadvantage in their international operations. See
A. Timothy Martin, Corruption and Improper Payments: Global Trends and Applicable Laws, 36 ALBERTA L. REV.
416, 428 (1998).
44. Pieth, supra note 40, at 1.
45. Id.
46. When New Zealand signed the OECD Corruption Convention, the country's Trade Minister, Lock-
wood Smith, stated that the convention will level the playing field for New Zealand companies. See Press
Release: New Zealand Government, Dec. 18, 1997 (visited Mar. 8, 2000) <http://www.newsroom.co.nz>.
When, in October 1997, the U.S. Congress gave final approval to legislation that implements the OECD
Convention, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright issued a press statement praising the Congress for
passing the anti-bribery pact. The secretary has long felt enlisting other countries in the fight against com-
mercial bribery not only will level the playing field for U.S. business, but will also foster stronger democratic
institutions in transition and developing companies, the statement read. See Statement by James P. Rubin,
Spokesman: Congress Approves Anti-Bribery Treaty Legislation (visited Mar. 8, 2000) <http://www.usis-
israel.org.il/publish/press/state/archive>.
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with companies from other regions.47 Thus, it is to the economic interests of the United
States, the OECD, and the European Union that their national companies are allowed to
do business abroad without having to bribe their way.4 s If in fact that is the case, then the
success of these conventions will be measured in terms of how far they go in eliminating
the competitive disadvantage these companies may be experiencing in those regions of the
world where corruption is endemic. In this respect, it can be assumed that the present
international regime against corruption is not all that concerned about what happens once
economic distortions and inefficiencies have been removed. Alternatively, in defense of the
approach taken by these conventions, it is arguable that everybody benefits from the crea-
tion of a level playing field not just Euro-American business interests. Be that as it may, the
perception that the major industrial countries are cutting treaty deals with one another with
the aim of eliminating any competitive disadvantages their companies may be experiencing
in the global marketplace will likely undermine any serious multilateral efforts at combating
corruption.
Finally, because of their narrow scope, i.e., the restrictive definition of corruption to
mean either supply or demand-side bribery, these conventions may end up discouraging
rather than encouraging adhesion by a large number of states that have a strong interest in
joining forces to combat the problem of corruption.49 This will be especially true for states
that have been the victims of outrageous acts of corruption, committed by high-ranking
officials who then fled abroad to avoid prosecution in their national courts. For these states,
the present anti-corruption regime offers them no incentives. They will have to think twice
47. 1994 OECD Council Recommendation on Bribery in International Transactions leaves no room for
doubt when it states "that bribery is a widespread phenomenon in international business transactions, including
trade and investment, raising serious moral and political concerns and distorting international competitive
conditions." Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: Council Recommendation on Bribery in Inter-
national Business Transactions, OECD Press Release SG/PRESS (94) 36; reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1389 (Sept. 1994).
48. In welcoming the adoption of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, an American business consultant
admitted that the U.S. stood to gain from its passage: "The OECD convention is intended to smooth out some
of the inequities faced by the U.S. since the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977. For the past two
decades, because of the FCPA, the U.S. has been hobbled by laws prohibiting bribes to foreign officials and
restrained by compliance and reporting requirements absent from the laws of its trading partners. [As a con-
sequence] U.S. companies have lost more than 100 international contracts valued at US$45 billion in 1994 and
1995 as a result of bribery." Herschman, supra note 38, at 1. These views were echoed on the floor of the
United States Senate by Senator Feingold: "IThere has been a price for taking the ethical high road. U.S.
companies that are trying to pursue opportunities in the global marketplace are forced to compete with firms
from countries whose national laws take a more-shall we say-laissez-faire approach to this issue, and turn
a blind eye to the corruption and graft evident in many business transactions." Transcript: Feingold On Senate
Okay of OECD Accord on Bribery (visited Mar. 8, 2000) <http://rs9.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/R?rl05:
FLD001:$59669>. It would appear that the United States' desire to have other countries' multinational com-
panies play by the rules applicable to American companies was a critical factor in the U.S. push for international
support for criminalizing bribery of foreign public officials in both the OECD and Inter-American conventions
against corruption. Having failed at the United Nations in the 1970s, the U.S. switched attention to the OECD
and the OAS. See Martin, supra note 43, at 428.
49. Nigeria is a case in point. There is every indication that the newly elected president, Olusegun Obasanjo,
building on the foundation laid down by Abacha's successor, General Abubakar, is determined to move ag-
gressively against corruption. On a recent visit to the United States, President-elect Obasanjo publiclydescribed
Nigeria as "one of the leading, if not the leading, corrupt nations in the world" while acknowledging that,
"[als a nation we cannot move in the area that I believe we should move-to have investment and to have a
better economy-without dealing with this issue." Obasanjo and Clinton Discuss Democracy, BBC ONLINE
NETWORK, Mar. 31, 1999 (visited Feb. 29, 2000) <http://news2.tms.bbc.co.uk/m/english/world/africa/
newsid%SF308000/30801 l.stm>.
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before rushing to ratify an anti-corruption treaty that restricts the definition of corruption
to simply the offering or demanding of bribes. Such victim states would be looking for
treaties that also take a stand against those public officials who plunder their nation's wealth,
which they then transfer to offshore safe havens.
In sum, the conventional definitions of corruption can be likened to fishing nets that
bring in smelts and minnows but are not sturdy enough to trap the bigger catch. Their
target appears to be the rent-seeking traffic cop or the custom official or the office mes-
senger but not the unemployed wife of the president of the Republic who habitually directs
the managing director of her country's Central Bank to withdraw hundreds of thousands
of dollars that she has no intention of repaying to cover her shopping expenses in Paris and
Rome. It would be a quantum leap in logic to treat the depredations of this first lady with
the petty corruption of underpaid low-ranking civil servants. While both sets of acts fall
within the general meaning of corruption, they clearly are not the same in their gravity or
scale. In any event, the position taken here is that in order to wage an effective international
war on corruption both the rent-seeking conduct of the customs official and the brazen
acts of pillaging by high-ranking public officials and members of their families must be
addressed. In other words, the war must proceed on three fronts: on the supply side, by
taking action against bribe givers and on the demand side, by sanctioning the recipients of
the fruits of bribery. Finally, it must also rein in those in positions of power who use their
positions of trust to plunder their nation's wealth, even though their activities do not quite
fall under the supply side or the demand side of the corruption ledger.
IV. The New Face of Corruption
Corruption is not a new phenomenon and "it is unlikely that there has ever been a ruling
class which did not exploit its political power to further its private financial interests."' 0 But
there is something extraordinary about the corruption I have in mind, for the last three
decades have revealed theft of national wealth on a scale that simply defies the imagination.5
To place this new venality on the same moral plane as bribery is to trivialize and reduce to
banality the impact of this practice on victim societies. Perhaps a few examples will suffice
to drive home this point.
There can be no better example to begin with than with the case of Field Marshall
Mobutu Sese Seko, whose years as head of state remain the example par excellence of this
novel form of kleptocracy2 In the thirty-two years that he was the incontestable ruler of
the former Republic of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), Mobutu suc-
ceeded in embezzling some four billion" dollars of his nation's wealth. If Mobutu's conduct
was outrageous, consider that of the late General Sani Abacha of Nigeria who seized power
in a coup d'itat in 1993 and ruled Nigeria with an iron fist until his sudden death in 1998.
50. European Parliament Resolution, supra note 16, Explanatory Statement No. 2 (b).
51. Many political leaders in countries with serious poverty have amassed extraordinary fortunes. Foreign
exchange reserves have been transferred to foreign bank accounts. WORLD BANK, supra note 8, at 16.
52. For an excellent account of how Mobutu systematically and methodically pillaged from his nation's
resources, see COLETrE BRAECKMAN, LE DINOsAURE: LE ZAIRE DE Moau-ru (1990). Mobutu was ousted from
power by Laurent Kabila and his band of loyal guerilla fighters in May 1997, and in September of the same
year he died in exile in Morocco.
53. See Seidi Mulero, Nigeria: Use Stolen Billions to Pay the Debt, IPS, Aug. 10, 1998, available in WESTLAW,
INTERPS File.
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His tenure as head of a modern state is perhaps one of the most egregious cases of corrup-
tion by a public official in this century. The depredations of Abacha expose the weakness
in the restrictive definition of corruption promoted in the present international legal re-
gime. Based on credible estimates by the respectable Times of London, Abacha is believed to
have stashed in European banks more than 3.6 billion pounds sterling (approximately $5.4
billion)14 during his five-year tenure as head of state.55 Yet, he was not done. Over a two-
year period and acting under the instructions of General Abacha, his national security
adviser withdrew close to $2.45 billion from the Central Bank ostensibly to pay back debts
owed to Russian contractors for the construction of the giant Ajaokuta Steel plant.16 The
debts owed the Russians were grossly overvalued allowing the Abacha family to pocket the
difference. The fraud was uncovered by the successor government, which eventually re-
covered some of the stolen money." But the outrage continues. According to a Government
White Paper, the Nigerian government earned $12.22 5 billion from sales of surplus petro-
leum during the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Of this amount the military generals made away
with $12 billion and only $225 million trickled back into the national treasury.
As is typical of stolen national wealth, much of it is banked in offshore safe havens and
hardly ever invested in economically productive enterprises at home. To this extent, the
victim country loses twice as the exported national wealth contributes to the problem of
flight capital. Additionally, it is also typical in these cases that individuals involved usually
skip town to avoid prosecution in their national courts. Again, the victim state loses a third
time as its citizens are denied the opportunity to bring these individuals to justice. Con-
ventional definitions of "corruption" as the "abuse of public power for private benefit" or
the "intentional noncompliance with arm's length relationship aimed at deriving some ad-
vantage from this behavior for oneself or related individuals" or "the behavior of persons
54. Id.
55. Several months after his death, General Abacha's widow was intercepted at the Kano International
Airport with 38 suitcases stuffed with foreign currency. One of her sons who was accompanying her also had
with him about $100 million in cash, while between $2 to $3 billion is believed in the safe-keeping of the late
general's foreign front men. His security adviser returned $250 million to the Nigerian government, funds that
had been set aside for distribution to African heads of state attending the 1998 summit of the Organization of
African Unity holding at Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Ironically, General Abacha, who was expected at that
summit, suffered a heart attack literally on the eve of the first plenary session. See Cameron Duodu, How the
Grand Lootocracy Beggared Nigeria's People, THE OSERVR (U.K.), Nov. 22, 1998, at 25. But General Abacha
was not alone among Nigeria's former military rulers to raid the national coffers. His predecessor, General
Ibrahim Babanguida, who was head of state from 1985-1993, is reputed to have placed in overseas accounts
about 30 billion French Francs or roughly $5 billion. He too was in very good company. A Government White
Paper from the Pius Okigbo Commission reports that of $12.225 billion Nigeria earned from selling surplus
oil during the August 1990-March 1991 Gulf War, only $225 million found its way into the Central Bank.
The bulk of these earnings, a cool $12 billion, the generals made off with. See Mulero, supra note 53.
56. See $4 Billion Missing: Abacha Aide Held, REUTERS, June 8,1998, available in WESTLAW, RTRLWIRES
File. Ajaokuta has been described as one of Africa's disastrous development projects. It was budgeted at $1.4
billion but ended up costing the Nigerian taxpayer $4 billion. Construction began in the late 1970s and has
dragged on at enormous cost for two decades. Yet, it has never produced a single piece of steel! See Nigeria
Alleges Huge Abacha Fraud, BBC, Dec. 3, 1998, available in WESTLAW, BBCWM File; see also GLOBAL CO-
ALITION FOR AFRICA, CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA, GCA/PF/N.2/11/1997, at 12 (1997) [here-
inafter CORRUPTION IN AFRICA].
57. The government of General Abdulsalami Abubakar has recovered about $750 million of this money in
various currency denominations from General Abacha's family. Apparently, the Abachas had no confidence in
the Nigerian banks. The amount recovered included $625 million in dollar notes and another $125 million
in pounds sterling. See Nigeria Alleges Huge Abacba Fraud, supra note 56, at 2.
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with public or private responsibilities who fail to fulfil their duties because a financial or
other advantage has been granted or directly or indirectly offered to them" 8 do not quite
capture the acts of fraudulent enrichment committed by public officials nor do they convey
in graphic terms the devastating effects of this conduct on many developing countries. The
price these countries pay for the venality of high-ranking officials is treacherously high.
The diversion of scarce national resources into the accounts of a few well-placed officials
and members of their family affects all segments of the society. Casualties include the pro-
cess of democratization and economic development.
Thus, the acts of spoliation referenced above fall within the category of offenses of ex-
ceptional gravity and magnitude. They take on additional gravity because they are com-
mitted by persons in positions of power and influence who can hide behind the shield of
sovereign immunity to avoid prosecution in their countries. The individuals involved are,
arguably, more culpable than the rent-seeking traffic cop or customs official, in part because
rent-seeking behavior "on the part of public officials in many African countries is a
consequence of extremely low salaries ... [compounded by] compressed wage scales and
limited opportunities for advancement."' 9 The Global Coalition for Africa found out in its
study of corruption and development in Africa: "low salaries which may partly explain the
existence of petty corruption and theft at lower levels ... [but] it cannot be an excuse for
higher-level and large scale bureaucratic corruption. Unless high-level bureaucratic cor-
ruption is addressed, it will be difficult to reduce corruption at lower-levels."6' While rent-
seeking is, arguably, tolerable and economically defensible, the acts of spoliation typified
by the examples just cited exceed any society's threshold of tolerance. They qualify as acts
of corruption carried out in a systematic manner or on a large scale.
A. THE RIGHT TO A CORRUPTION-FREE SOCIETY AS A FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT
The notion of human rights is derived from the belief that all human beings are born
equal in dignity and rights, and that these moral claims are inalienable and inherent in all
human individuals by virtue of their humanity. Having been transformed into justiciable
legal rights through the international law-creating process, these erstwhile moral claims
now constitute the corpus of fundamental human rights protected under international law.
Consistent with the Lockean vision of rights,"1 the owners of these evidently basic rights
of humankind-life, liberty and property-have never surrendered them to the state.
Rather, all that the individual surrenders to the state upon entering civil society is the right
to have these rights enforced by the state.
The right to a society free of corruption is inherently a basic human right because life,
dignity, and other important human values depend on this right. That is, it is a right without
which these essential values lose their meaning. As a fundamental right, the right to a
corruption-free society cannot be easily discarded "even for the good of the greatest num-
ber, even for the greatest good of all." 62 The right to a corruption-free society flows from
58. European Parliament Resolution, supra note 16, item 1.
59. See CORRUPTION IN AFRICA, supra note 56, at 12.
60. Id.
61. See generally JOHN LOCKE, TREATISE (SEcoND) OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT §§ 4, 14, 87-89,95, 135-38,228-
29 (Vere Chappel ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (1690).
62. See Louis HENKIN, THE ACE OF RIGHTS 1-5 (1990).
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the right of a people to exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural resources and
wealth, that is, their right to economic self-determination, recognized in common article
1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights63 and the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 64 which reads:
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources
without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation,
based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people
be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
The antecedents of the principle of permanent sovereignty can be traced to the demarche
by Third World nations in the early formative years of the United Nations for a reappraisal
with a view toward altering the "'inequitable' legal arrangements, in the form of conces-
sions, inherited from the colonial period, under which foreign investors (mostly transna-
tional corporations with their headquarters in the metropolitan country) were exploiting
their natural resources."65 The global debate that ensued between capital-importing Third
World countries, the owners of the natural resources, and the capital-exporting developed
countries where the majority of the foreign investors concessionaires are based, finally led
to the adoption in 1962 in the General Assembly of Resolution 1803 (XVII) on Permanent
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources 66 This resolution together with subsequent U.N. res-
olutions and declarations67 has expanded the meaning of the people's patrimony over which
permanent sovereignty is to be exercised to include not just wealth derived from natural
resources but all the wealth-generating activities in the society. With respect to this ex-
panded definition of the people's patrimony, the right to the exercise of sovereignty over
63. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
64. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
65. Kamal Hossain, Introduction: Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, in LEGAL AsPECTS OF THE
NEw INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 33, 33-34 (Kamal Hossain ed., 1980); Hasan S. Zakariya, Sovereignty
Over Natural Resources and The Search for a New International Order, in LEGAL AsPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 208 (Kamal Hossain ed., 1980).
66. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803 (XVII) (1962).
67. See, e.g., Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171, U.N. GAOR, 28th
Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973) (strongly reaffirms the inalienable rights of states to
permanent sovereignty over all their natural resources, on land within their international boundaries as well as
those in the sea-bed and the subsoil thereof within their national jurisdiction and in the superjacent waters);
Declaration on the Establishment of a New Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess.,
Supp. No. 1, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974) ("art. 4: The new international economic order should be founded
on full respect for the following principles: (e) Full permanent sovereignty of every State over its natural
resources and all economic activities. In order to safeguard these resources, each State is entitled to exercise
effective control over them and their exploitation with means suitable to its own situation, including the right
to nationalization or transfer or ownership to its nationals, this right being an expression of the full permanent
sovereignty of the State. No State may be subjected to economic, political or any other type of coercion to
prevent the free and full exercise of this inalienable right."); Charter of Economic Rights and Duties ofStates, G.A.
Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) ("art. 2(1): Every
State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all
its wealth, natural resources and economic activities.").
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a nation's natural wealth and resources means two things.6 First, the right of states to
exercise control over their natural wealth and resources, and secondly, the right of all peo-
ples within the state to freely use, exploit and dispose of their natural wealth and resources
in the supreme interest of their national development. In both instances, economic self-
determination is the ultimate objective. In this sense, a state can violate the right to eco-
nomic self-determination in one of two ways. A violation occurs when the state alienates
the people's patrimony in its resources by corrupt or unwise concessions to foreign com-
panies.69 The state is also in violation of the right to economic self-determination when it
engages in the corrupt transfer of ownership of national wealth to those select nationals
who occupy positions of power or influence in the society. The violation by the state also
operates to deny the people, individually and collectively, their right to freely use, exploit
and dispose of their national wealth in a manner that advances their development.
The right to a corruption-free society also implicates the collective right to development.
Henkin has defined this right as the "sum, or the aim, of all the rights in the [Universal]
Declaration, especially the right to an education and of other economic and social rights,
but also civil and political rights."10 As Henkin sees it, the importance of development in
the human rights context rests on the predicate that without development it would not be
possible to respect and insure individual rights.
Political development is essential to assure the human right to participate in self-government
in one's own country. Economic development will better enable a country to guarantee the
economic and social rights of its inhabitants, will increase the resources available for that
purpose and help achieve it more expeditiously. Societal development is essential for individual
development which is necessary to enable individuals to know their rights, to claim them, to
realize and to enjoy them and the human dignity they promise."
In 1986, the United Nations General Assembly took a major step in the direction of
elevating this right to the level of a principle of customary law when it adopted the Dec-
laration to the Right to Development." The declaration proclaims the right to development
as an inalienable human right of every human being and all people to participate in, con-
tribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development. Corruption by
public servants undermines all of these laudable goals. Democritus was right after all:
"[w]hen the state is in a healthy condition, all things prosper; when it is corrupt, all things
go to ruin." In the sections that follow, we shall argue that those who by their acts of
corruption contribute toward the ruination of a society commit a universal crime that en-
gages their individual responsibility.
68. This discussion draws on chapter 3 of my book. NDIvA KOFELE-KALE, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RE-
SPONSIBILITY FOR ECONOMIC CRIMES (1995).
69. Such was the contention by Nauru in a 1992 claim brought before the International Court of Justice
against Australia. Nauru claimed that Australia, as an Administering Authority for Nauru under the United
Nations Trusteeship System provided for by Chapter XII of the U.N. Charter, breached its obligation to
respect the right of the Nauruan people to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources by
exploiting certain phosphate lands before Nauru's independence. See Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Na-
uru v. Australia), 1992 I.C.J. 240, 243 (June 26); see also Antony Anghie, The Heart of My Home: Colonialism,
Environmental Damage, and the Nauru Case, 34 HARv. INT'L L.J. 445 (1993).
70. Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 198 (1995).
71. HENKIN, supra note 62, at 191.
72. See Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53,
at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986).
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B. CORRUPTION AS A CRIME OF UNIVERSAL INTEREST
When the Berlin-based anti-corruption organization, Transparency International, issued
its 1998 Corruptions Perceptions Index (CPI), its Vice Chairman Frank Vogl made the
following observation:
The CPI scores, with their shocking portrayal of so many countries perceived to be home to
rampant corruption, will spur Transparency International to be even more aggressive in mobi-
lising initiatives to counter corruption world-wide. Securing democracy, alleviating poverty
and human suffering, and sustaining investment and commerce, are inextricably dependent
upon curbing corruption in most of the developing nations and across Central and Eastern
Europe.7"
These are the reasons why official corruption deserves to be treated as a crime of universal
concern because of its potential for destroying the essential foundations of a society.
C. ATTRIBUTES OF A UNIVERSAL CRIME
An essential characteristic of universal crimes is that a "state may participate in their
repression even though they were not committed in its territory, were not committed by
one of its nationals, or were not otherwise within its jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce.' 4
A crime of universal interest, that is, a crime under international law, can be characterized
as such irrespective of its designation under domestic law." This is what is meant by the
principle of the supremacy of international law over national law; reaffirmed in the Draft
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (Draft Code of Crimes)7 6 in
73. See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, 1998 CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX (1998) (visited Mar. 9, 2000)
<http://www.gwdg.de/-uwvw/l> ; see also infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
74. JOSEPH MODESTE SWEENEY ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 118
(3d ed. 1988).
75. See PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW RECOGNIZED IN THE CHARTER OF THE NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL
AND IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIBUNAL, Principle 1, Aug. 21, 1950. This principle recognizes the supremacy
of intemational criminal law over national law in the context of the obligations of individuals. Principle II goes
on to state that: The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a crime under
international law does not relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility under international
law. Both principles are reflected in the judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal: the essence of the Charter is
that individuals have international duties that transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the
individual State. See id.
76. The code had as its objective the adoption of norms to prevent and punish international crimes, against
the conscience and survival of mankind. Its genesis lies in the horrors of the Second World War and the
international tribunals set up by the Allied Powers at Nuremberg and Tokyo to try the leaders and organizers
of the worst of these barbarities. In 1947, two years after the United Nations was established, the General
Assembly created the International Law Commission (ILC) and charged it with the task of identifying and
formulating the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in
the judgment of the Tribunal, and to prepare, based on those principles, a Draft Code of Offenses Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind. The ILC interpreted this mandate to mean elaborating a code of crimes to
which individual criminal responsibility would attach. The ILC submitted a first draft code to the General
Assembly in 1951, a second draft in 1954. Thereafter, work on the commission was suspended. After a 27 year
hiatus, the General Assembly invited the ILC to resume its work on the Draft Code. By 1991, the ILC was
ready with another draft and, in 1996, it submitted a final version to the General Assembly. See Rosemary
Rayfuse, The Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind Eating Disorders at the ILC, 8 CRIM.
L. REV. 43 (1997).
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article 2."1 Additionally, crimes of universal interest must come with adequate safeguards to
protect the rights of the accused, for instance, the prohibition against double jeopardy (non
bis in idem)18 and non-retroactivity. The former protects an individual accused of committing
an international crime from being prosecuted or punished more than once for the same act
or the same crime. It guards against multiple trials conducted in different national courts
for the same offense. 9 Where the principle of non bis in idem seeks to safeguard the accused
from capricious judicial treatment in the criminal justice process, the doctrine of retroac-
tivity seeks to uphold the fundamental objective of criminal law which is to prohibit, to
punish and to deter conduct considered sufficiently serious in nature to justify characterizing
it a crime. 0 Satisfying this principle requires that the standard of conduct that differentiates
between permissible and prohibited conduct be defined a priori. For as the Commentary
to the Draft Code of Crimes points out "[t] he prosecution and punishment of an individual
for an act or omission that was not prohibited when the individual decided to act or to
refrain from acting would be manifestly unjust." ' This provision is without prejudice to
the prosecution and punishment of an accused for a crime under pre-existing national law,
provided the national law in question is applied in conformity with international law. 2
Finally, an international crime must satisfy the principle of aut dedere autjudicare, which
places any state in whose territory the alleged accused is present under an obligation to
extradite or prosecute. The fundamental purpose of this principle, which is found in all the
anti-bribery conventions, 3 is "to ensure that individuals who are responsible for particularly
serious crimes are brought to justice by providing for the effective prosecution and punish-
ment of such individuals by a competent jurisdiction."84 The obligation imposed on the
custodial state is to ensure that the accused is prosecuted either by the national courts of
that state or by another state ready and willing to prosecute as evidenced in a formal ex-
tradition request.8" Finally, as with all crimes under international law, responsibility for their
commission remains with the individual. The individual's official position whether as head
77. The characterization of an act or omission as a crime against the peace and security of mankind is
independent of internal law. The fact that an act or omission is or is not punishable under internal law does
not affect this characterization. It should be noted that the Draft Code applies this principle to a much broader
set of crimes whereas the Nuremberg Charter's express reference to this relation between international and
national responsibility was only with respect to crimes against humanity.
78. See e.g., Draft Code of Crimes, art. 12 and common art. 12 (Yugoslavia), (Rwanda).
79. The Draft Code of Crimes recognizes two exceptions to the principle of non bis in idem. Article (2)
permits an international criminal court to try an accused for breach of an international crime arising out of the
same act that was the subject of a previous national court proceeding if the accused was tried by the latter court
for an ordinary crime rather than a more serious crime. The second exception to the double jeopardy rule
provides for an accused to be tried by an international criminal court for a crime under international law arising
out of the same act or even for the same crime that was the subject of a prior national court judgment provided
the national court proceedings were not impartial or independent or were designed to shield the accused from
international criminal responsibility or the case was not diligently prosecuted. The idea here is to prevent sham
trials for violations of serious crimes.
80. See id. cmt. 1.
81. Id.
82. See id. art. 13, cmt. 6.
83. See Inter-American Convention, supra note 33, art. XIII; OECD Convention, supra note 23, art. 10;
Criminal Law Convention, art. 27.
84. Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 78, art. 9, commentary 2.
85. See id.
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of state or government does not operate as a bar to the application of the principle of
individual responsibility.s6
D. RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT
Under what circumstances will an individual incur responsibility for participating in or
otherwise contributing significantly in the commission of acts that qualify as a crime under
international law? This question arises when the person who issues the instructions to
commit such an offense is beyond the reach of national courts for purposes of in personam
jurisdiction. For instance, shortly after General Abacha's death, the successor regime came
full face with this dilemma. As discussed earlier, a scheme to defraud the Nigerian govern-
ment by members of the late General Abacha's family was uncovered by General Abubakar,
Abacha's successor as head of state. The late general's national security adviser who was at
the center of the fraud scheme was arrested and he implicated the late general. The aide
claimed that the billions of dollars traced to him were withdrawn from the Central Bank
on the instructions of the Head of State, General Sani Abacha. When questioned by the
press whether the former national security adviser under his predecessor would be crimi-
nally prosecuted, General Abubakar responded that such an exercise would be futile because
the main actor is dead and gone. The main problem as General Abubakar saw it was one
of corroborating the testimony of Abacha's surviving aides: "[t]here is nobody to counteract
(sic) what the security adviser is saying. So this is the dilemma we are having.""7 It is not
an insurmountable dilemma, however. Under the Draft Code of Crimes, responsibility and
punishment attach to the author of an international crime, if he was directly involved in its
commission, or for complicity in its commission or attempt to commit the crime."' The
activities of the late General Abacha's national security adviser are covered under the Draft
Code of Crimes: either he was directly involved or was an accomplice in or attempted to
defraud Nigerian taxpayers of hundreds of millions of their hard earned money. The death
of Abacha does not relieve his surviving national security adviser of responsibility and,
ultimately, punishment for his involvement in the fleecing of the Nigerian patrimony.
The Nuremberg Tribunal acknowledged that "crimes against international law are com-
mitted by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit
such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced." 9 Article 1 of the Draft
Code of Crimes which sets out the scope and application of the code provides that the code
applies to those crimes set out in Part H and that those crimes are punishable under inter-
national law whether or not they are punishable under domestic law. The commentary to
article 2 of the Draft Code of Crimes that establishes the principle of individual criminal
responsibility for the commission of crimes against the peace and security of mankind notes
that this principle is the enduring legacy of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment: "It was
submitted that international law is concerned with the actions of sovereign States, and
provides no punishment for individuals.... "0 In the opinion of the tribunal [this submis-
86. Beginning with the Nuremberg Charter the official position of an individual is not a defense to crimes
under international law. This principle is reflected in the Draft Code of Crimes (art. 2), and the Statutes of
the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (art. 7, paragraph 2 ) and Rwanda (art. 6).
87. See Gbadamosi Wahab, Abubakar Rules Out Trial of Gwarzo and Abacka's Wife, (visited Nov. 20, 1998)
<http://www.africanews.org>.
88. See Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 78, art. 2, para. 3 and Commentary.
89. See NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL, supra note 75.
90. See Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 78, art. 2.
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sion] must be rejected. That international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals
as well as upon States has long been recognized. The principle of individual responsibility
and punishment for international crimes is widely acknowledged as the cornerstone of
international criminal law. It was most recently reaffirmed in the Statutes of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (article 7, paragraph 1 and article 23,
paragraph 1) and Rwanda (article 6, paragraph 1 and article 22, paragraph 1).
Punishment is the other half of the doctrine of individual responsibility for crimes under
international law. Punishment is essential as a deterrent against violations of the law. Article
3 of the Draft Code of Crimes codifies this double-edged principle by providing that "an
individual who is responsible for a [crime under international law] shall be liable to pun-
ishment. The punishment shall be commensurate with the character and gravity of the
crime."9' As a universal crime, the penalty for acts of indigenous spoliation will depend on
the jurisdiction which in turn will determine the appropriate penalty and the severity.92 So,
for instance, if a state were exercising jurisdictional competence over the accused, its na-
tional courts may decide on the applicable penalty and "may or may not admit extenuating
or aggravating circumstances. '" 93 On the other hand, if jurisdiction is exercised by an inter-
national court, the applicable punishment will be fixed by "an international convention,
either in the statute of the international court or in another instrument if the statute of the
international court does not so provide." 94
E. SATISFYING AN EXACTING STANDARD
But does corruption as used in this article meet the Nuremberg Charter and the Draft
Code of Crimes' exacting standard of an international crime which entails individual re-
sponsibility? As a preliminary matter, a prohibited conduct qualifies as a crime under the
Draft Code of Crimes' standard, if it is of such a character as to threaten international peace
and security. That is, it must be seen as a crime of exceptional gravity or extraordinary
magnitude and of sufficient seriousness to justify the concern of the entire international
community. Several features distinguish economic spoliation from the specie of corruption
dealt with in the various anti-bribery conventions to justify its elevation to a crime of
universal concern.
91. Id. art. 3.
92. For instance, the OECD Convention provides, in art. 3, paragraphs 1-3, that the crime of active bribery
is punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties. These include monetary sanctions
as well as the seizure and confiscation of the bribe and the proceeds of the bribery, i.e., the profits or other
benefits derived by the bribe-giver from the transaction or other improper advantage obtained or retained
through bribery. An individual found guilty of acts of bribery is also open to a variety of noncriminal fines in
addition to civil or administrative sanctions such as exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid, tem-
porary or permanent disqualification from participation in public procurement or from the practice of other
commercial activities, placing under judicial supervision, and judicial winding-up order. See OECD, Com-
mentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of Officials in International Business Transactions.
Adopted on Nov. 21, 1997, Commentary to art. 3; see also Criminal Law Convention, art. 19 (the offense of
bribery in all its forms shall be subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions and measures,
including... penalties involving deprivation of liberty which can give rise to extradition.).
93. See Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 78, art. 3, Commentary (5).
94. Id. art. 3, Commentary (7).
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F. THE EVIDENCE
1. State Practice
Corruption has long been prohibited by the laws95 and the constitutions of most states;96
in the old democracies of Western Europe and North America, the new democracies of
Central and Eastern Europe and the proto-democracies of Asia and Africa. It is expressly
prohibited in the constitutions of Haiti, 97 Nigeria, 98 Paraguay,99 Peru, 00 the Philippines'0'
and Sierra Leone, 102 to mention but a few. Because of the gravity of the problem, special
tribunals and commissions of inquiry have been set up in various countries to probe into
and try cases of corruption by public officials. °3 These developments evidence expressions
of de legeferanda for treating corruption as a crime punishable under international law.
2. Expressions of International Concern
Pronouncements by states in recent years also evidence a universal condemnation of
corrupt practices by public officials and a general interest in cooperating to suppress them.
This widespread condemnation of acts of corruption is reflected in the preambles of a
number of multilateral anti-corruption conventions and resolutions of international orga-
95. For a representative sample of domestic anti-corruption laws, see The Prevention of Bribery Act,
ch. 81; The Tracing and Forfeiture of Proceeds of Drug Trafficking Act, ch. 86; The Dangerous Drugs Act,
ch. 223; The Public Disclosure Act, ch. 9; The Penal Code, ch. 77; Money Laundering (Proceeds of Crime)
Act (No. 8 of 1996), (Bahamas) CRIMINAL CODE, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, §§ 118-23, (Can.). Interim Provisions
on Administrative Sanctions for Corruption and Bribery by State Administrative Personnel, the Implementing
Regulations for the Interim Provisions on Administrative Sanctions for Corruption and Bribery, the Provisions
Prohibiting State Administrative Offices and Personnel from Giving and Accepting Gifts, and the Supplemen-
tary Provisions Relating to the Punishment of Corruption and Bribery to the Criminal Law of March 14,1997,
(China). Anti-Corruption Statute-Law 190 of 1995, (Colo.) Penal Code §§ 161-162, 165, Prevention of
Corruption Act of 1947, (India). Law No. 11 of 1980 Regarding Bribery; the Penal Code, 1915; Law No. 3 of
1971 Regarding Suppression of Criminal Corrupt Deeds, (Indonesia). The Criminal Code of the Kazak Soviet
Socialist Republic of July 22, 1959, amended June 12, 1986, article 147; Decree No. 9 of the Plenum of the
Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakstan on the Practice of the Application by Courts of the Legislation
on Responsibility for Corruption Dec. 22, 1995 (Kazakstan). Korean Criminal Code, articles 129, 133; Criminal
Code, Economic Crimes Law No. 2; Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Apr. 1979, art. 226 (Libya).
Criminal Code (Federal Republic of Nigeria, Cap. 77) (1990) § 98; Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal
Act (Federal Republic of Nigeria, Cap. 56); The Organic Law for the Protection of the Public Patrimony
(Venezuela). Criminal Code of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam; Criminal Law No. 12 of the Yemen Arab
Republic, 1994.
96. See NDIVA KOFELE-KALE, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR EcoNoMic CRIMES: HoLs-
ING HEADS OF STATE AND OTHER HIGH RANKING STATE OFFICIALS INDIVIDUALLY LIABLE FOR ACTS OF FRAUD-
ULENT ENRICHMENT, 183-215 (1995).
97. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI, 1987, art. 21.
98. 1989 CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA, Fifth Schedule.
99. CONSTITUTION OF PARAGUAY, Chapter IV, General Provisions, art. 41.
100. POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF PERU, art. 62.
101. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, art. X1, Sec. 1.
102. THE CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA LEONE, Sec. 97(b) (1991).
103. See e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA, Title V, Legislative Organ. Chapter II, art. 142
(creating a permanent judicial commission to try constitutional officers under art. 171 for economic crimes
(corruption, embezzlement and misappropriation) among other crimes); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPURLIC OF
PANAMA, art. X1, Sec. 4 (establishing Anti-Graft Courts and the Independent Office of the Ombudsman).
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nizations. 1°4 Reading through them leaves one in no doubt as to the seriousness with which
the international community as a whole attaches to the problem of corruption.
The Criminal Law Convention sets outs in its preamble a concise outline of the serious
and varied forms of damage caused by corruption and the urgent need to combat it through
a multi-disciplinary national and international approach. The Parties to the Criminal Law
Convention expressly acknowledge that "corruption threatens the rule of law, democracy
and human rights, undermines good governance, fairness and social justice, distorts com-
petition, hinders economic development and endangers the stability of democratic insti-
tutions and the moral foundations of society."'' 0 In the 1994 Summit of the Americas Dec-
laration of Principles and Plan of Action, the Heads of State of thirty-four nations of the
southern hemisphere pointedly linked the survival of democracy to the eradication of cor-
ruption. "Effective democracy," they declared, "requires a comprehensive attack on cor-
ruption as a factor of social disintegration and distortion of the economic system that un-
dermines the legitimacy of political institutions." 10 6 In the preamble to the Inter-American
Convention that followed the 1994 summit, again the leaders of the OAS came back to the
theme of corruption as a phenomenon that undermines the legitimacy of public institutions
and strikes at society, moral order and justice, as well as the comprehensive development
of peoples. Acknowledging that corruption has international dimensions, the signatories of
the convention agreed on the need for prompt adoption of an international instrument to
promote and facilitate international cooperation in fighting corruption and the responsi-
bility of states to hold corrupt persons accountable.
On December 16, 1996, the United Nations General Assembly, acting on an earlier
recommendation of the Economic and Social Commission, adopted the United Nations
Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions.
The declaration highlights the economic costs of corruption and bribery, and points out
that a stable and transparent environment for international commercial transactions in all
countries is essential for the mobilization of investment, finance, technology, skills and other
resources across national borders. Member states pledge in the declaration to criminalize
bribery of foreign public officials in an effective and coordinated manner and to deny the
tax deductibility of bribes paid by any private or public corporation or individual of a
member state to any public official or elected representative of another country. Corruption
was also the subject of a 1997 United Nations General Assembly Resolution entitled Action
Against Corruption. The resolution underscored the General Assembly's concern about
the serious problems posed by corrupt practices to the stability and security of societies,
the values of democracy and morality, and to social, economic and political development.' 0 '
104. In interpreting a treaty, the preamble and annexes are included as part of the text of the treaty. See
generally, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (with annexes). Concluded at Vienna, May 23, 1969.
Entered into force, Jan. 27, 1988. 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 1969 U.NJ.Y.B. 140; 1980 U.K.T.S. 58, Cmnd. 7964;
reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969), art. 31, paragraph 1.
105. Council of Europe, Preamble to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (visited Feb. 26, 2000)
<http://www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/173e.htm>; reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 505 (1999).
106. Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, Dec. 11, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 808,
811.
107. Available empirical evidence suggests a correlation between corruption and economic growth and in-
vestment. Statistically, the relationship is negative: a one standard deviation improvement in the corruption
index is associated with a four percentage point increase in investment and over a half percentage point increase
in the annual growth rate of per capita GDP. See CORRUPTION IN AFRICA, svpra note 56, at 12.
SPRING 2000
172 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
The resolution also drew a link between corruption and organized crime, including money
laundering. Interestingly enough, the preamble of the Inter-American Convention called
attention to the "steadily increasing links between corruption and the proceeds generated
by illicit narcotics trafficking... which undermine and threaten legitimate commercial and
financial activities, and society, at all levels." ' s Acknowledging that corruption now has
trans-border effects, the General Assembly's anti-corruption resolution recommends a
multilateral approach to combat it.
G. THE PERSPECTIVE OF PUBLICISTS
Bribery of foreign public officials is listed as one of twenty-two international crimes by
a leading publicist. 09 This crime meets Professor Bassiouni's ten penal characteristics of an
international crime: (1) explicit recognition of proscribed conduct as constituting an inter-
national crime, a crime under international law, or a crime; (2) implicit recognition of the
penal nature of the act by establishing a duty to prohibit, prevent, prosecute and punish;
(3) criminalization of the proscribed conduct; (4) duty or right to prosecute; (5) duty or
right to punish the proscribed conduct; (6) duty or right to extradite; (7) duty or right to
cooperate in prosecution, punishment (including judicial assistance in penal proceedings);
(8) establishment of a criminal jurisdictional basis (or theory of criminal jurisdiction or
priority in criminal jurisdiction); (9) reference to the establishment of an international
criminal court or international tribunal with penal characteristics (or prerogatives); and
(10) elimination of the defense of superior orders."0
One can safely conclude that an emerging customary law norm that treats corruption as
a crime under international law draws strong support from the following: (a) consistent,
widespread and representative State practice proscribing and criminalizing the practice;
(b) the widespread condemnation of acts of corruption reflected in the preambles of these
multilateral anti-corruption treaties and in declarations and resolutions of international
organizations; (c) pronouncements by states in recent years that evidence a universal con-
demnation of corrupt practices by public officials (in these pronouncements corruption is
described in weighty language: a phenomenon that threatens the rule of law, democracy
108. In the same vein, a 1995 Resolution on Combating Corruption in Europe adopted by the European
Parliament also stressed the ties between corruption and organized crime while expressing the view that com-
bating the latter can help to curb the former. European Parliament Resolution, supra note 16.
109. It is interesting to note that the noted publicist, Cherif Bassiouni, classified bribery and corruption of
public officials as an economic crime under international law at a time when the international legal regime for
this conduct consisted only of four instruments of questionable binding force: (1) a resolution from regional
organization: Organization of American States Permanent Council, Resolution on the Behavior of Transna-
tional Enterprises, July 10, 1975, OEA/Ser. G., CP/RES.154 (167/75) corr.1 (1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M.
1326; (2) a declaration from another regional economic organization: Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development, Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, June 21, 1976,
OECD Press Release, A(76)20, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 967; (3) an ECOSOC instrument: U.N. REPORT OF THE
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE ON AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON ILLICIT PAYMENTS, U.N. Dot.
E/1979/104 (1979); and (4) a draft code: U.N. COMM'N ON TRANSNAT'L CORPORATIONS, DRAFT U.N. CODE OF
CONDUCT ON TRNsNATioNAL CORPORATIONS, U.N. Doc. E/1993/17/Rev.l.\, Annex II (1983). See M. Cherif
Bassiouni, The Penal Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal Law, 15 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 27
(1983); Enforcing Human Rights Through International Criminal Law and Through an International Criminal Court,
in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY at 347 (L. Henkin & J. Hargrove eds. 1994).
110. Bassiouni, supra note 109, at 27.
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and human rights; hinders economic development; and endangers the stability of demo-
cratic institutions and the moral foundations of society); (d) a general interest in cooperating
to suppress acts of corruption; and (e) the writings of noted publicists recognizing corrup-
tion as a component of international economic crimes."' From the foregoing, a strong
argument can be made for treating corruption as a crime under international law for which
individual responsibility and punishment attach.
H. CONFORMITY WITH THE DRAFT CODE AND NUREMBERG PRINCIPLES STANDARD
The Draft Code of Crimes defines a crime against humanity in its article 18 to mean
certain acts "committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale.""' This standard in-
corporates two alternative requirements both of which are satisfied in cases involving acts
of economic spoliation. Under the first requirement, for an act to rise to the level of a crime
of economic spoliation, it must occur pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy, the exe-
cution of which could result in the repeated or continuous commission of acts of spoliation.
As the commentary to article 18 explains, the thrust of this requirement is to exclude a
random act that was not committed as part of a broader plan. Clear examples of a precon-
ceived plan or policy within the meaning of article 18 of the Draft Code would be, for
instance, the scheme by the late General Abacha, with the assistance of his key lieutenants,
to defraud the Nigerian Government by overvaluing the debt owed to the Russians who
contracted to construct a giant steel plant and then pocketing the bulk of the funds with-
drawn from the Central Bank; or, his involvement in other acts of theft that made it possible
for him to amass more wealth in a period of five years than Mobutu could in thirty-two
years in power.
The second requirement is that acts of spoliation must occur on a large scale for them
to qualify as a crime. This has been interpreted to mean that the acts that form the basis
of the crime must take place multiple times. The commission of one isolated act would not
suffice because the test focuses on the result of the cumulative effect of a series of inhumane
acts or the singular effect of an inhumane act of extraordinary magnitude. Qualifying as an
act of extraordinary magnitude would be the sale by the Nigerian government of surplus
11. See, e.g., the collection of essays in NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, LA CORRUPTION INTERNATIONALE: COLLOQUE
Du NoUVEL OBSERVATEUR (1999).
112. The Draft Code of Crimes takes a restrictive approach to the definition of a crime against the peace
and security of mankind. It limits its list of crimes under this category to a hard core of crimes that are of such
gravity that they have victimized mankind as a whole. This approach was dictated by the need to strike a balance
between legal idealism and political realism. But before settling for this restrictive description, the International
Law Commission went through six other possible approaches to defining crimes under international law:
(1) crimes defined in terms of their gravity and significance; (2) crimes that correspond to the legal rules accepted
by states and considered serious enough to be defined as crimes against the peace and security of mankind, and
translated into acts sufficiently identifiable to appear in a criminal text; (3) crimes that shock the conscience of
mankind; (4) crimes that were directed against the fundamental interests of the international community and
the conscience of mankind and consequently threatened peace and security, and sufficiently serious to justify
the concern of the entire international community; (5) definition that should hinge on seriousness, massive
nature, and violation of the international legal order; and (6) definition based on a basket of several principles,
including, nullum crimen sine lege, gravity of the conduct that offends universal sensibilities and constitutes a
serious threat to the peace and security of mankind, etc. Topical Summary: Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace
and Security of Mankind, U.N. GAOR Int'l Law Comm'n, 6th Comm., 47th Sess., $ 21-27, at 8-10, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/472 (1992).
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oil during the Gulf War for $12.225 billion, only $225 million of which went into the
Central Bank while the rest, a cool $12 billion, was diverted into the private bank accounts
of the country's military rulers.
There is something fundamentally different between the acts of corruption just described
and the practice of offering a bribe to a local council clerk to expedite the birth registration
of a child. A plot to swindle $2.45 billion from the national treasury with the knowledge
and connivance of the head of state should not even be called corruption, at least as the
term is used in treaty law. Such a brazen act deserves another name. I have called it patri-
monicide elsewhere."3 In formulating the concept of genocide shortly after World War II,
Ralph Lemkin acknowledged that there have been mass killings before in history and that
they will continue to occur in the future."" But what the Nazis did tops the scale of mass
killings and could not be dismissed as another unplanned spree of senseless killings of
innocent people. What they did was planned well in advance, organized and systematically
carried out with the single-minded objective of exterminating a whole race of people. Lem-
kin argued that this form of wholesale organized slaughter of innocent and defenseless
people deserved another name. Genocide was this new name he coined by stringing two
Latin words together to describe the unspeakable horrors that were committed by the
Nazis.'
This is the view I hold of indigenous spoliation, it is corruption to be sure but corrup-
tion of a higher degree. The activities associated with this conduct satisfy the exacting
standard of the Nuremberg Principles and the International Law Commission's (ILC) Draft
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. As such, they should be treated
as a crime of universal concern.
In sum, the foregoing public statements convey normative rules that have been widely
accepted as law (opiniojuris) by a representative majority of states.
V. Conclusion: Obstacles to the Emergence
of an Anticorruption Customary Law Norm
Several obstacles stand in the way of the crystallization of an international legal norm
against corruption. We call attention here to two of them.
A. THE PROBLEM OF ENFORCEMENT AT THE LEVEL OF NATIONAL COURTS
The problems associated with criminalizing domestic behavior at the international level
might lead some to question why the fight against corruption is not being handled at the
national level. This concern goes to the question of enforcement. If in fact corruption is
given the status of an international crime will there be an effective enforcement of the law
against violators or potential violators? Two methods have been employed in enforcing
violations of crimes under international law: the direct method through an international
113. The word "patrimonicide" comes from combining the Latin words patrimonium, (meaning [tlhe estate
or property belonging by ancient right to an institution, corporation, or class; especially the ancient estate or
endowment of a church or religious body) and cide, meaning killing. See Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Patrimonicide: The
International Economic Crime ofIndigenous Spoliation, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 48, 58 (1995).
114. See Raphael Lemkin, Genocide: A Modern Crime, 9 FREE WORLD, Apr. 1945, at 39.
115. See RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AxIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 79 (1944).
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criminal tribunal or the indirect method through a national court and national laws. There
are, however, several problems in relying on the domestic legal regime in the fight against
corruption. As Professor Bassiouni observed
the indirect method is flawed as [c]ourts in many parts of the world will not be able or will
refuse to prosecute nationals who, acting pursuant to executive policy, violate international
norms. Moreover, the prosecution of the officials of one state by courts of another state could
create political conflict or encounter jurisdictional difficulty. "6
This problem is avoided when enforcement is placed in the hands of an international tri-
bunal.
Prosecutions of corruption cases in domestic courts, even when the accused are nationals
of the custodial state, tend to be sporadic and highly dependent on the political mood of
the day. They generate much enthusiasm particularly in the euphoria following the suc-
cessful overthrow of the previous regime. The successor government then promises to clean
up the Augean stables as it promises greater transparency and accountability in governance.
But as time goes on these promises are quickly forgotten as the new rulers begin to behave
no differently from their predecessors. Nonetheless, every now and then the commitment
to eradicate corruption in society is revived and a burst of prosecutions commence when
international financial lending institutions make transparency and accountability prereq-
uisites in loan agreements. But as one would expect from reforms driven by reasons of
expediency, once the emergency recedes the enthusiasm to prosecute violations of corrup-
tion laws also wanes.
Secondly, even when prosecutions of violators are pursued in earnest, more often than
not the targets have usually been the low level, underpaid rent seeking officials. And the
explanation is simple: the major violators, high ranking members of government, almost
always flee to safe havens, out of reach of the forum's jurisdiction. Besides, before they
leave office many of these high profile violators of anti-corruption laws usually take the
usual precaution of enacting legislation immunizing them from judicial prosecution for acts
taken while in office. It has not been that long since Senator Pinochet of Chile advanced
this defense against a request from the Spanish government to the United Kingdom gov-
ernment for his extradition to Spain to answer to charges for crimes against humanity."7
Chile demanded the return of Senator Pinochet claiming that the crimes alleged against
him were the subject of a general amnesty in 1978, and a subsequent scrutiny by the Chilean
Commission of Truth and Reconciliation in 1990.11s While such amnesty laws may succeed
in shielding heads of state against corruption charges in the national courts, they may not
work that well in foreign jurisdictions, as Pinochet found out in England.
116. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Law and Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW, vol. 1, Crimes 15, 27 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986).
117. See Regina v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte 4 All E.R. 897,
3 W.L.R. 1456, (House of Lords, 1998).
118. On April 19, 1978, while Pinochet was still head of state, the Chilean Senate passed a decree granting
amnesty to all persons involved in the crimes for which Pinochet is alleged to have committed (torture, gen-
ocide, and so on) between September 11, 1973 and March 10, 1978. After Pinochet fell from power, the
successor democratic government appointed a Commission for Truth and Reconciliation. The commission's
terms of reference were to investigate all violations of human rights between 1973 and 1990, and to make
recommendations. The commission reported on February 9, 1991.
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But even when the defense of sovereign immunity is unavailable for an accused in the
national courts and he eventually is convicted and ordered to forfeit his ill-gotten wealth,
the victory for the nation is a pyrrhic one at best. With the stolen funds in safe keeping
abroad, seizure and repatriation present some formidable legal and practical challenges:
whether the hidden assets be found, whether foreign courts will enforce judgments from
the courts of victim states, and so on.
B. SOVEREIGN DENIALS AND RESISTANCE
The internal resistance likely to be put up by states that have been branded corrupt by
external observers is a factor that must be reckoned with in the formation of this new
international regime against corruption.' 9 A case in point is the Cameroon Government's
angry reaction to Transparency International's (TI) 1998 CPI, 2° which ranked Cameroon
as the country perceived to be the most corrupt in the world.'' Soon after CPI was made
public, the Cameroon Government went into a full court press to destroy the bonafides of
Transparency International.22 TI was attacked for mischaracterization, for the motives be-
hind the exercise, and for the methodology it employed in drawing up the perceptions
index. The campaign to denigrate TI and its work was orchestrated from the highest level
of government, the presidency no less. In a statement issued from the presidency, the deputy
Secretary General of the Presidency dismissed the report as a "nasty political manoeuver
... a callous manoeuver of intoxication" intended to "tarnish the image of Cameroon and
discourage investors." The report was a gross misrepresentation of Cameroonian realities
as it ignored giant strides taken by the government in the past decade to institutionalize a
culture of accountability, transparency, and probity in public governance. The CPI, the
government claimed, cannot be taken seriously because of its flawed methodology: the
119. African leaders are not even willing to take responsibility for not doing anything to curb corruption in
their countries. It will come as no surprise that when the problem of corruption was raised during a Global
Forum for Africa Plenary in Maastricht in November 1995, many African leaders blamed the industrialized
countries and their multinationals for worsening corruption in their countries! See GCA, Corruption and De-
velopment in Aftica: Policy Forum (visited Feb. 29, 2000) <http://www.gca-cma.org/epfdoc97.htn>.
120. TI is a global anti-corruption organization founded in 1993 with over 60 national chapters around the
globe and an International Secretariat based in Berlin. Working through its vast network of national chapters,
TI strives to mobilize civil society, business, academia and government in its relendess fight against corruption
both nationally and internationally.
121. According to Transparency International, the 1998 Corruption Perceptions Index is the most com-
prehensive index of perceptions of corruption ever published. The CPI is described as a poll of polls reflecting
the results of several different surveys of expert and public views of the extent of corruption in many countries
around the world. Eighty-five countries were ranked on the 1998 CPI and assigned a score ranging between
10 (highly clean) and zero (highly corrupt). The index only captures perceptions of the degree of corruption
as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public. Denmark with a perfect score of 10 was ranked
the most highly clean country while Cameroon's score was 1.4. About two-thirds of the countries on the index
received scores well below 5. See Transparency International, 1998 Corruptions Perceptions Index Press Release
(visited Feb. 28, 2000) <http://www.gwdg.de/-uwvw/icr.htm>.
122. Ironically, a few months later, Cameroon's President Biya in a New Year Address to the Nation ad-
mitted that corruption had become a serious national problem that was gnawing at the moral and economic
foundations of the society! In the televised end-of-year message, the president accused his compatriots for
accumulating illicit wealth... [and for being] well versed in cheating, fraud and even swindling. See Cameroon-
Politics: Biya Calls for Justice, Security, Morality and a Fight Against Corruption (visited Feb. 28, 2000)
<www.boh.org/english/cm/1999/01013 54/n4.html>.
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surveys on which the CPI was constructed were described as phantom "multinational com-
pany heads who claim to be working in Cameroon," concluding that there are no infallible
instruments that have yet been found that can accurately measure corruption in any country,
let alone rank countries on a scale. 2 3 Worse, TI, the brain behind this survey, was accused
of being "on the pay of neocolonialists" and "clusters of people at work" to undermine
Cameroon's efforts to develop.14
From the point of view of positive international law, sovereign resistance to the corrup-
tion label carries a couple of consequences. In the first place, if Cameroon's response is any
indication of how other like-minded states on the CPI will react, such noisy and bellicose
response will likely affect the number of ratifications and accessions to multilateral anti-
corruption treaties as fewer countries will be interested in becoming signatories. Such non-
adherence potentially denies these instruments the widespread and representative partici-
pation of states, 2 ' this being one of the crucial elements in transforming an anti-corruption
treaty norm into a rule of customary international law binding even to states that are not
signatories to the instrument. 2 6 But sovereign resistance to the corruption label may also,
in another sense, operate as a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary law that
proscribes corruption. Such resistance may signal a state's intention to be treated as a per-
sistent objector in the face of this emerging rule of customary law.'27 As a general rule, a
state that registers its dissent from a practice while the law is still in the process of devel-
opment is not bound by that rule even after it matures. 2 ' A dissenting state could further
123. A commentator on the government-controlled state radio was equally dismissive of the CPI on grounds
that it lacks authority [and expresses] a view that is not based on any scientific basis, [being] a pure invention
of its authors' imagination, entirely subjective [and established] for hidden motives. State Radio Reacts Angrily
to Report Ranking Cameroon the World's Most Corrupt Country; Cameroon: World Champion of Corruption, Says
Transparency International (visited Feb. 28, 2000) <www.boh.org/english/cm/1998/0923254/n4.htm>.
124. See Cameroon's Presidency Denounces the Transparency International Corruption Report (visited Feb. 28,
2000) <www.boh.org/english/cm/1998/0925256.>
125. For example, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is open to the signature of nonmember states. Five
non-OECD states, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile and the Slovak Republic, have signed on and Israel has
also requested to join.
126. The World Court, in its 1969 Judgment on the North Sea Continental Shelf, spelled out the conditions
by which norm-creating provisions from a convention pass into the general corpus of international law so as to
have binding effect on third states: (1) that it would be necessary in the first place that the provision concerned
should be of a fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a
general rule of law; (2) these rules, by their very nature, must have equal force for all members of the inter-
national community, and cannot therefore be subject to any right of unilateral exclusion (that is to say, these
rules cannot be subject to unilateral denunciation and reservations by parties to a codification convention);
(3) widespread and representative participation in the convention might suffice, provided it included states
whose interests were specially affected; (4) state practice, including that of states whose interests are specially
affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked, and
should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal
obligation is involved; and (5) the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily a bar to the formation
of a new rule of customary international law. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work
of its Twenty-First Session, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 9 63, 72-74, U.N. Doc. A/7610/Rev. 1 (1969).
127. For the World Court's perspective on the persistent objector principle, see North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases (Judgment) (F.R.G./Den.) (F.R.G./Neth.), 1969 I.CJ. 3, 41-45, 1969 WL 1; see also Ted L. Stein, The
Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Ohjector in International Law, 26 IARV. INT'L
L.J. 457, 463-69 (1985); and Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent ObjectorRule and the Development of Customaty
International Law, 56 BRIT.Y.B. Isrr'L L. 1 (1985).
128. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102, comment d (American Law Institute, 1987).
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down the road invoke as a defense against the binding force of such a norm, should it
eventually attain the status of a rule of positive international law, its open and notorious
objection. States that are on record as having challenged ab initio the fundamental basis of
these new rules can always claim that they had earlier opted out of, and therefore are not
bound by, the new anticorruption law.129 Such a defense is all the more compelling especially
when applied to a norm that does not yet carry the weight of an expression ofjus cogens.' 3°
129. It bears repeating, if only for emphasis, that international law is no more than the corpus of legal rules
by which states freely agree to be bound, either in terms expressed in a treaty or by implied agreement (tacitus
consensus) through custom. That a rule of customary law is not binding on any state indicating its dissent during
the development of the rule is an accepted application of the traditional principle that international law essen-
tially depends on the participant state's consent. See id., Reporters Note 3.
130. On the international normative scale, ajus cogens norm enjoys the status of a super norm that trumps
all lesser norms, so to speak, and states cannot contract out of theirjus cogens obligations. According to the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: "A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with
a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same character." See Vienna Convention, supra note 104, art. 53.
As a general rule, a treaty norm that conflicts with a peremptory norm (jus cogens) of international law is not
enforceable.
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